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From Hard Consensus to Soft Euroscepticism: 
Attitudes of Croatian MPs on EU Integration 
Bojana Kocijan & Marko Kukec ∗ 
Abstract: »Vom mühsam erreichten Konsens zur leichten Euroskepsis. Einstel-
lungen der kroatischen Parlamentarier zur EU-Integration«. In this article, we 
offer the first systematic study of the attitudes of Croatian MPs about various 
aspects of Europeanness. Following the overwhelming elite consensus in 2012, 
when Croatia was about to join, MPs are still relatively satisfied with the EU in 
2014. We argue beneficiary member mindset prevails among Croatian MPs 
suppressing any greater degree of Euroscepticism. However, ‘soft Euroscepti-
cism’ is present, especially among right wing HDZ. Our analysis rests on 70 in-
terviews with MPs and is a part of ENEC (2014) project. Croatian MPs take visi-
ble consideration of symbolic and strategic aspects when thinking about the 
EU. They have solid confidence in the EU institutions, report satisfaction with 
EU returns, favor further policy Europeanization and strongly identify as Euro-
pean elite. Negative feedback about the EU relates to poor representation of 
Croatia’s interests. Our analysis reveals that by ceding some sovereignty MPs 
hope to compensate for redistribution of benefits by further policy Europeani-
zation and better channels of interest representation. EU budget receivers seem 
to be better off in the EU rather than outside. 
Keywords: Europeanness, national MPs, party dissent, beneficiary member, soft 
Euroscepticism. 
1.  Introduction1 
Scholars noted that party elites in the new Member States of European Union 
tend to follow a predictable pattern over time. In almost all cases, party elites 
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adopt agendas that are consistent with the EU during the accession process 
(Vachudova 2008). After completing all pre-accession requirements, Croatia 
became EU’s 28th member on July 01, 2013, after Croatian MPs in March 
2012 unanimously voted in favor of Croatia’s EU entry. Croatia’s EU member-
ship was rare political agenda that neutralized political differences between the 
left-oriented SDP and right-oriented HDZ (Maldini and Pauković 2016). The 
‘Gotovina case’2 and Constitution amendments3 demonstrate the prospects of 
‘permissive consensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009), as Croatian political elite, 
driven by the notion of ’return to Europe’ (Lindstrom 2003), at least temporari-
ly put aside differences and led the country towards the EU membership.  
Although Croatian parliamentary parties were strongly in favor of EU ac-
cession, Eurosceptic voices in the campaign preceding the EU accession refer-
endum were not absent. The public was less favorable of joining, especially 
before 2005 when Croatia had uneasy relationship with the Hague Tribunal and 
bilateral disputes with Slovenia and Italy. Public referendum, held in January 
2013, shortly before the unanimous parliamentary vote revealed that a solid 
part of the public was Eurosceptic. The results of the referendum were 66% in 
favor and 33% against with a 44% turnout, which reveals a visible dose of 
Euroscepticism among citizens who turned out to vote. Reasons for Euroscep-
ticism among Croatians were multifold, but among others included mistrust 
towards the elites, poor governments’ performances, lack of information about 
the EU and national identity issues (Franc and Medjugorac 2013). Greek crisis 
that unfolded in 2013, just as Croatia was about to join has at least partially 
contributed to public Euroscepticism.  
In this article, we study MPs attitudes in three dimensions of Europeanness; 
emotional attachment, rational calculation and EU’s scope of competences 
(Best, Lengyel, and Verzichelli 2012, 8-9) and seek for evidence of ‘constrain-
ing dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009) among Croatian party elites. Once 
accession-related constraints are lifted, party differences regarding many EU-
related issues become apparent, especially among parties that adopt nationalist 
and culturally conservative positions (Vachudova 2008). Building on this ar-
gument, we suggest that the extent of ‘constraining dissensus’ among Croatian 
parliamentarians is conditioned upon the ‘beneficiary member mindset’. MPs 
attitudes on Europeanness are generally positive, however, when inter-party 
differences exist, negative feedback about Europeanness is more voiced by 
right wing HDZ. Nevertheless, negative attitudes about the EU by right wing 
                                                             
2  Despite previous claims in 2001 that the prosecution of Croatian war-time generals is out of 
question, in 2005, Ivo Sanader, then leader of HDZ and Prime minister extradited General 
Ante Gotovina, per request of the Hague Tribunal, in exchange for re-opening of the Croa-
tian-EU talks, which created rage among is right-wing voter base. 
3  The government amended the constitution for a referendum with less than 50% turnout to 
be valid, thus preventing Eurosceptics to use abstention as a potential tool to hijack the ref-
erendum. 
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MPs can be viewed only as ‘soft Euroscepticim’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 
2004), because MPs rational calculations about EU benefits suppress any 
stronger anti-EU voices. Moreover, soft Eurosceptic attitudes are most likely 
along the cultural and value dimensions, rather than issues related to the econ-
omy (Vachudova 2008). 
Our study is the first systematic attempt to examine attitudes of Croatian 
party elites on different aspects of EU integration. Our data are part of ENEC 
(2014) project that we complement with Chapel Hill Expert Survey data in the 
section on general EU integration attitudes. In 2014, we interviewed the same 
set of MPs who voted in favor of Croatia’s entry in 2012, which created a 
unique opportunity to study their attitudes only two years into Croatia’s mem-
bership and uncover patterns of inter-party differences. In our analysis, we 
predominantly focus on MPs from the three largest Croatian parties in 2011-
2015 legislature; HDZ4, SDP5 and HNS6. HDZ was the main opposition party 
during this term positioned around the center regarding economic matters, but 
towards the right in cultural and value issues. SDP and HNS were members of 
the government positioned on the left in culture and value issues and similar to 
HDZ around the center regarding economic matters. We expect greater inter-
party differences in cultural and value dimensions of Europeanness and almost 
no differences in economic matters. Beneficiary member mindset is likely to 
suppress Euroscepticism, especially along economic issues, while soft Euro-
scepticism is expected along cultural and value issues, especially among right 
wing MPs. 
Our data reveal Croatian MPs are generally largely positive about various 
aspects of Europeanness after its short EU membership. They are satisfied with 
EU benefits and largely identify as European elite. They are somewhat content 
with EU’s performance during economic crisis and report solid trust in EU 
institutions. Inter-party differences however reveal that negative feedback 
about Europeanness is voiced by right wing HDZ, especially along national 
identity and sovereignty issues. In addition, soft Euroscepticism is voiced by 
both political camps in reference to representation of Croatian interests at the 
EU level, although it is not always clear if soft Euroscepticism reveals true 
negative attitudes, or at times also government-opposition dynamic. Benefi-
ciary member mindset is clearly at work when it comes to the scope of govern-
ance and Europeanization of policy areas. Croatian MPs highly favor extension 
of the powers of the Parliament and the Commission and are fond of further 
policy Europeanization. MPs hope to compensate positive feedback for poten-
tial redistributive capacities and protection of Croatia’s interests that would 
                                                             
4  HDZ – Croatian Democratic Union. 
5  SDP – Social Democratic Party. 
6  HNS – Croatian People’s Party. 
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result from further Europeanization. This explains only soft Euroscepticism in 
only value dimension of Europeanness. 
The article proceeds as follows. First, we address MPs rational calculation 
attitudes where we examine MPs’ stands on EU benefits, efficacy of EU deci-
sion-making process, trust into and performance of the EU institutions. Next, 
we examine emotional attachment attitudes and those on threats to the EU. 
Finally, we address attitudes on the scope of governance and on further Euro-
peanization of several policy areas. The conclusion summarizes our findings. 
2.  Rational calculation attitudes of Europeanness 
2.1  Benefits of EU Membership 
We begin our data analysis by examining the attitudes of Croatian MPs regard-
ing benefits of Croatian first year of EU membership (Table 1). Overall, 69% 
of MPs believe that Croatia benefited from EU membership, but the attitudes 
also seem to be structured along the government-opposition line. Nearly 90% 
of MPs from government parties recognize benefits during the first year of EU 
membership, while only 45% of opposition MPs do so. However, the opposi-
tion is divided between mainstream HDZ, whose 63% of MPs recognize the 
benefits, and smaller parties at both right and left flanks of the party system, 
which are most disappointed with the Croatian track record in the EU7. There-
fore, at the party level, government MPs almost uniformly applaud the EU 
membership benefits, while the opposition is divided between sceptics from 
mainstream HDZ and deniers of benefits from fringe opposition. These atti-
tudes are not surprising, taking in the account the governing position of SDP, 
mainstream oppositional status of HDZ and fringe position of smaller opposi-
tion parties.  
Table 1: Benefits of EU Membership, by Government Status (valid percentages) 
Government status Benefited1 Not benefited N 
Government2 89.2 10.8 37 
Opposition3 45.2 54.8 31 
Total 69.1 30.9 68 
1 Survey question: “Taking everything into consideration, would you say that Croatia has on 
balance benefited or not from being a member of the European Union?” 
2 SDP, HNS, IDS and HSU. 
3 HDZ, HSP AS, DC, OraH, HL, HDSSB, HSS, and Independents. 
 
                                                             
7  On the right of the political spectrum, MP of HSP AS and three out of four MPs from HDSSB 
deny benefits of EU membership, while on the left of political spectrum, all MPs from OraH 
and Labor Party also deny benefits. 
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As the government is responsible for day-to-day affairs with the EU, both 
success and failure in capitalizing on EU membership can be attributed to its 
work. Therefore, government parties defend the track record of their govern-
ment, while the opposition, as a part of its competitive strategy has an incentive 
to expose the failure of the government to pick up benefits of EU membership. 
Within the opposition, mainstream opposition, however, usually abstains from 
completely denying any potential or real benefits of the EU membership, as 
they are aware that at any point in the foreseeable future, they might assume 
the governing position (de Vries and Hobolt 2012, 251). HDZ indeed frequent-
ly lamented the incapacity of the incumbent SDP-led government to properly 
manage EU funds, but still recognized some benefits of EU membership 
(Arnold, Sapir, and de Vries 2012, 1345). As noted by Raos (2016), HDZ and 
SDP actually compete over who is more capable of properly managing EU 
funds, turning EU benefits into a valence issue. As theorized in the introduc-
tion, the reliance of Croatia and its mainstream political elites on EU funding 
constrains the movement of mainstream parties towards hard Euroscepticism. 
Fringe opposition parties, on the other hand, are fairly free to express their 
traditionally strong reservations towards European integration (de Vries and 
Hobolt 2012, 251; Adam and Maier 2011, 435), as many of these parties are 
almost permanent opposition. 
2.2  MPs Attitudes About the Efficacy of EU Decision Making 
Process 
In this section, we analyze how satisfied MPs are with representation of Croa-
tian interests at the European level, as well as how they feel about interest 
representation of other members. As demonstrated in the Table 2, MPs are 
generally disappointed with interest representation at the EU level. About 96% 
of MPs agree that interests of some members are overrepresented, while about 
75% of MPs agree that Croatian interests are not taken in the account suffi-
ciently at the EU level. This is in line with previous elite research, where schol-
ars described the issue of interest representation as the ‘glass half empty’, be-
cause EU elites are generally dissatisfied with the unequal treatment of EU 
members (Cotta and Russo 2012, 31), where larger members have clear ad-
vantage over smaller ones to influence EU policy making (Panke 2010; 
Thorhallsson and Wivel 2006, 658). 
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Table 2: Interest Representation in the EU (valid percentages) 
 Agree2 Disagree3 N 
Croatian interests are underrepresented at the EU level1 75 20 67 
Interests of some Member States are overrepresented at 
the EU level1 96 4 67 
1 Survey question: “How do you agree with the following statement: EU decision-makers do 
not sufficiently take in the account Croatian interests.” 
2 'Agree strongly' and 'agree somewhat' merged as one category. 
3 'Disagree somewhat' and 'disagree strongly' merged as one category. 
 
When we analyze data at the party level (Table 3), we observe that MPs in both 
political camps think poorly about EU interest representation. However, MPs 
from HDZ are slightly more concerned about unequal representation of Croa-
tian interests than MPs from SDP and HNS. Unequal interest representation is 
the dimension of Europeanness where Eurosceptic sentiments among all Croa-
tian MPs are strongest, which is largely related to the small member status of 
Croatia that is at least in practice disadvantaged in influencing EU policymak-
ing compared to big members. However, more Euroscepticism is voiced by 
MPs from right wing HDZ. It is unclear however, if their stronger negative 
sentiments about interest representation must be understood as a strategic tool 
of the opposition to criticize the capacity of SDP-led government to lobby for 
Croatian interests in the EU, or as concerns about national and sovereignty 
issues once accession-related constraints are lifted, which is natural to parties 
positioned on the right. 
Table 3: Inter-party Differences: Under-representation of Croatian Interests 
and Overrepresentation of Interests of some Member States in the EU 
(valid percentages) 
Underrepresentation of Croatia in the EU* SDP HDZ HNS 
Agree1 74 88 78 
Disagree2 26 12 22 
N 23 16 9 
Overrepresentation of some Member States at 
the EU level** SDP HDZ HNS 
Agree1 91 100 89 
Disagree2 9 0 11 
N 23 17 9 
Survey questions: “*EU decision-makers do not take Croatian interests sufficiently in the 
account; **Interests of some Member States are overrepresented at the EU level.” 
1 'Strongly agree' and 'agree somewhat' merged as one category. 
2 'Strongly disagree' and ‘somewhat disagree' merged as one category. 
2.3  Trust Into the EU Institutions 
According to the data in Table 4, only 43% of Croatian MPs report high satis-
faction with EU institutions, while only a small percentage of MPs (8%) re-
ports low levels of trust in the EU institutions. Most MPs (48%) report some 
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trust in EU institutions. Although the difference in levels of trust between EU 
institutions is not dramatic, MPs have greater trust in EU Parliament (53% of 
MPs report high levels of trust in EP). Somewhat less trusted are European 
Commission (40% of MPs highly trust EC) and Council of Ministers (37% of 
MPs highly trust CoM). However, EC and CoM are not totally distrusted ei-
ther, because slightly more than 50% of MPs report average levels of trust in 
both EC and CoM. 
Table 4: Trust into EU Institutions (valid percentages) 
 High (7-10) Medium (4-6) Low (0-3) N 
European Parliament 53 41 6 70 
European Commission 40 51 9 70 
Council of Ministers 37 53 10 70 
Total average 43 48 8 70 
Survey question: “Please tell me on a 0-10 scale how much you personally trust each of the 
following EU institutions to usually take the right decisions. 0 means that you do not trust an 
institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.” 
 
It has been noted by previous elite research that the most trusted EU institution 
is EP, while EC and CoM were less trusted. This is primarily because EP is the 
product of national elections, which national elites still heavily control and the 
elites more likely trust institutions they have a direct control over. The Com-
mission, on the other hand, is least directly connected to the process of national 
representation and is in charge of judging parliament’s decisions, while Coun-
cil of Ministers is least trusted, although it is an institution more closely con-
nected to the system of national representation (Cotta and Russo 2012, 32). 
In Croatia, average levels of trust in EU institutions could relate to relatively 
short experience with the EU, where the elite, only one year into Croatia’s 
membership does not yet have proper experience and knowledge about the 
workings of the EU institutions and the impact of its decisions on Croatia. 
Croatian elite is in the learning process where full trust in the EU institutions 
might not be that easily granted. Trust in institutions is an indicator of institu-
tional design expected to produce preferred outcomes, and the elites accept a 
degree of dependence from EU institutions, expecting that the EU institutions 
act in accordance with shared criteria (Jerez Mir, Real Dato, and Vazquez 
Garcia 2014; Heinrich 2016). Once Croatia spends more time in the EU and if 
EU benefits continue to be evaluated positively by the elite, trust in EU institu-
tions is likely to increase in the future. It is also important to note that Croatia 
has only recently separated from one multi-national entity (Yugoslavia) where 
it registered negative experiences, so its elite might be careful in quickly ex-
pressing highly positive feelings about yet another entity of a similar format. 
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Table 5: Inter-party Differences: Trust into EU Institutions (average party 
positions) 
Party EP EC CoM N 
SDP 7.1 6.2 6.5 70 
HDZ 6.4 5.9 5.6 70 
HNS 7.1 6.4 6.7 70 
Survey question: “Please tell me on a 0-10 scale how much you personally trust each of the 
following EU institutions to usually take the right decisions. 0 means that you do not trust an 
institution at all, and 10 means you have complete trust.” 
 
Data in Table 5 demonstrate that inter-party differences, when it comes to 
trusting different EU institutions, are not dramatic. However, some soft Euro-
scepticism is present among right-wing HDZ whose MPs report lower levels of 
trust in the EU institutions, which supports the argument about right-wing MPs 
being more concerned about identity and sovereignty issues. Still, because 
average party scores of all parties are above the middle of the scale, we also 
conclude that beneficiary status of Croatia suppresses MPs from all parties to 
expose any greater extent of mistrust towards EU institutions.  
2.4  Attitudes on Performance of the EU Institutions During the 
Crisis 
In this section, we examine attitudes of the Croatian elite about institutional 
management of the Eurozone crisis by three EU institutions, European Council, 
the Commission, and the Central Bank. As data in Table 6 demonstrate, only 
23% of the elite reports high satisfaction with institutional performance during 
the Eurozone crisis and about 29% of the elite reports low satisfaction with its 
institutional management. Nevertheless, most MPs (45%) are somewhat con-
tent with how EU institutions functioned during the crisis. 
Table 6: Performance of the EU Institutions during Crisis (valid percentages) 
 High (7-10) Medium (4-6) Low (0-3) 
European Commission 26 47 25 
European Council 25 45 27 
European Central Bank 19 44 36 
Total average 23 45 29 
Survey question: “On a 0-10 scale, where 0 is very negative and 10 very positive, how would 
you evaluate the role played so far by the following European institutions during the Eurozone 
crisis?” 
 
According to the data in Table 6, the difference in levels of satisfaction with 
crisis management across the three EU institutions is not dramatic. MPs are 
lightly more positive when it comes to the performance of the Commission and 
somewhat more critical of the performance of the Central Bank. When we 
compare data in Tables 4 and 6, we see that Croatian elite is more trustful of, 
for example, EC and CoM, but is less pleased with how these two institutions 
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performed during the crisis. To this, we add that Croatia’s position is rather 
unique when it comes to its experiences with the crisis, because it joined the 
EU when the crisis was well under way in 2013, so the effects of the EU crisis 
management might have not fully reached Croatia by the time we conducted 
our fieldwork in 2014. In addition, while Croatia was among the members 
badly hurt by the crisis, it did not reach Greek levels and consequently, the 
Croatian MPs are still rather confident in the EU institutions. Because Croatia 
is EU budget beneficiary, it is expected that MPs would not be overly critical 
of performance of the EU institutions during crisis or greatly mistrust EU insti-
tutions. 
Table 7: Inter-party Differences: Performance of EU Institutions during 
Eurozone Crisis (average party positions) 
Party EC Council ECB 
SDP 5.0 4.9 4.4 
HDZ 5.2 5.4 5.3 
HNS 5.5 6.2 5.5 
Survey question: “On a 0-10 scale, where 0 is very negative and 10 very positive, how would 
you evaluate the role played so far by the following European institutions during the Eurozone 
crisis?” 
 
As we can see in Table 7, inter-party differences regarding performance of EU 
institutions during Eurozone crisis do not tell us a new story. Right wing HDZ 
MPs are actually slightly more positive about institutional performance during 
Eurozone crisis than MPs from left wing SDP and HNS. We conclude that 
although Croatian MPs are not highly positive about performance of EU insti-
tutions during crisis, they are not very critical about institutional management 
either as average party scores are around the middle of the scale for all parties. 
This again supports our claims that soft Euroscepticism is countered by benefi-
ciary member status. 
3.  Attitudes on Emotional Attachment and Threats to the 
European Union 
3.1  Attitudes on National and European Identity 
The idea of ‘Europe’ as the foundation of an identity is the key for the legitimi-
zation of the EU (Sassatelli 2002). If Europeans declare themselves as Europe-
an citizens, and not only as nationals of one of the 28 Member States, they then 
understand European polity as a concept broader than mere system of rules and 
regulations (Cotta and Russo 2012). If national MPs feel ‘European’ more 
often than ‘national’, or at least ‘as European’ as they feel ‘national’, we can 
safely assume they will easily accept and respect EU norms and procedures. In 
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this section, we study attitudes about identity of Croatian elites. As data in 
Table 8 demonstrate, Croatian MPs feel European almost as much as they feel 
Croatian. About 77% of Croatian MPs feel either very or somewhat attached to 
Europe, which is only slightly lower level of attachment compared to the at-
tachment to Croatia. 
Table 8: Attachment to Country, Region and Europe (valid percentages) 
 Attached1 Not very attached2 N 
Region 96 4 70 
Country 100 0 70 
Europe 77 23 70 
Survey question: “People feel different degrees of attachment to their region, to their country 
and to Europe. What about you? Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached 
or not at all attached?” 
1 'Very attached' and 'somewhat attached' merged as one category. 
2 'Not very attached' and 'not at all attached' merged as one category. 
 
A slightly smaller attachment to Europe than to Croatia supports claims of 
previous research that European identity, as supranational identity is not antag-
onistic to national identity, but can be seen as its extension. Europe is not a 
challenge to national bonds, but an acceptable complement (Cotta and Russo 
2012). To support this claim further, we find that only about 15% of MPs feel 
the EU endangers Croatia’s culture. These results give us confidence that na-
tional attachment of Croatian elite extends to supranational level, and demon-
strate that identifying with Croatia most often means identifying also with 
Europe. 
Table 9: Inter-party Differences: Attachment to Europe (valid percentages) 
 SDP HDZ HNS 
Attached1 79 76 100 
Not very attached2 21 24 0 
N 24 17 10 
Survey question: “People feel different degrees of attachment to their region, to their country 
and to Europe. What about you? Are you very attached, somewhat attached, not very attached 
or not at all attached?” 
1 'Very attached' and 'somewhat attached' merged as one category. 
2 'Not very attached' and 'not at all attached' merged as one category. 
 
According to the percentages in Table 9, we note there are no significant dif-
ferences in the levels of attachment to Europe and to Croatia between right and 
left oriented MPs. However, HDZ MPs are slightly less attached to Europe than 
MPs from SDP and HNS, which supports the argument about potentially 
stronger Eurosceptic attitudes among right wing MPs once the accession-
related constraints are lifted, especially when it comes to value and identity 
issues. However, attachment to Europe among Croatian MPs is generally 
strong and positive and reasons for this are both instrumental and symbolic. On 
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the one hand, the notion of ‘belonging to Europe’ and ‘to the West’ perpetuated 
positive feelings about Europe among Croatian elite and was perceived as a 
factor of distinction against other Yugoslav elites. Although strong attachment 
to Croatia is expected, positive feelings about Europe among Croatians most 
certainly also relate to these identity experiences prior to EU membership. 
Croatia’s road to the EU has been long and protracted process, but the elites 
from both political camps never wavered from Croatia’s EU path, especially in 
post-Tudjman era. Finally, because Croatia is the beneficiary of EU budget, 
strong attachments to Europe among Croatian MPs partially also relate to stra-
tegic calculations and its beneficiary status. 
3.2  Threats to the EU 
In the first comprehensive study of elite perceptions of threats to Europe, 
Matonyte and Morkevičius propose the notion of threats as ‘the other side of 
European identity’ (Matonyte and Morkevicius 2012). The strategy of ‘other-
ing’ is particularly worthwhile when identities such as European are in flux and 
an anchor is needed to facilitate the acceptance of a new identity (Pinar Erkem 
2009, 490). Diez (2004) distinguishes between ‘temporal others’ and ‘geo-
graphical others’ to group various threats that were instrumental in constructing 
the European identity since the end of the Second World War.  
Starting with ‘temporal others’ (Table 10), which triggered the formation of 
the EU (Diez 2004, 325), we observe that 58% of MPs think that preference for 
national interests is a potential threat for the EU. However, economic differ-
ences among Member States are seen as the largest among enumerated threats. 
This finding corresponds to the ‘beneficiary member mindset’, as Croatian 
political elite portrays economic differences as the large threat in order to en-
courage the EU to increase its efforts in equalizing economic development of 
Member States, which would benefit Croatia. 
Table 10: Threats to Cohesive Europe, by Party (valid percentages) 
 Economic differences Russia Immigration 
 Threat Not a threat Threat Not a threat Threat Not a threat 
HDZ 94.1 5.9 100  0 94.1  5.9 
SDP 91.7 8.3 62.5 37.5 36.4 63.6 
HNS 100 0 80 20 66.7 33.3 
Total1 94.3 5.7 76.8 23.1 67.2 32.8 
 Emerging countries National interests Turkey 
 Threat Not a threat Threat Not a threat Threat Not a threat 
HDZ 70.6 29.4 62.5 37.5 70.6 29.4 
SDP 58.3 41.7 80 20 17.4 82.6 
HNS 80 20 39.1 60.9 22.2 77.8 
Total1 61.8 38.2 58.2 41.8 37.3 62.7 
Survey question: “Do you think that (ITEM) is a threat or not a threat for the EU?” 
1 Based on responses of all Croatian MPs. 
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From the early 1990s, Islam become the main geographical ‘other’ of Europe 
(Diez 2004, 328). ‘Islam as a threat’ discourse was revived with the prospect of 
Turkish EU membership, which is currently dim as reflected in the responses 
of MPs, where only 37% of MPs believes the enlargement to Turkey is a threat 
to the EU. However, increasing immigration to Europe carrying with it a fear 
of Islam came on top of the EU agenda after summer 2015 and serves as an 
ideal ‘other’ (Jones 2015). About 67% of Croatian MPs perceive immigration 
as a threat to Europe, which is not surprising given Croatia’s homogenous and 
predominantly Catholic population. Alongside Turkey, Russia is another histor-
ical rival of Europe, and perceptions of it as a threat intensified after it annexed 
Crimea in 2014 and as Europe become more dependent on Russian gas 
(Weisser 2007, 2). About 77% of MPs regards Russia as a threat to Europe and 
it seems that ‘othering’ of Russia has taken roots among Croatian MPs. Other 
emerging economies could also assert themselves to the EU, through bilateral 
relationships with separate EU countries, from which Croatia does not profit 
(e.g., the import of goods ($2 bln.) from BRICS to Croatia exceeds the export 
($500 mil.) by four times), which is why 62% of MPs consider competition 
from the emerging economies as a threat to the EU.  
Up until this point, the analysis of threat perception was carried out at the 
aggregate level, which conceals possible inter-party differences. Table 10 re-
veals substantial differences between the two strongest parties (HDZ and SDP), 
with regard to immigration and Turkish EU membership, and less so for other 
threats. This finding is not surprising and fits our theoretical expectations re-
garding inter-party differences. The attitudes towards immigration and Turkish 
EU entry traditionally have sources in identity and values, rather than in atti-
tudes on economic matters (for immigration, see Manevska and Achterberg 
2011, 6-7; for Turkey, see de Vreese, Boomgaarden, and Semetko 2008, 520). 
As such, they map nicely to the cultural dimension of political conflict in Croa-
tia, which is more divisive and dominates over the matters of the economy 
(Coman 2015, 9; Henjak 2007, 85; Henjak 2011, 35). As argued in the intro-
duction, the issues, which fall outside of the cultural dimension produce less 
party disagreement. 
4.  Attitudes on European Integration and Allocation of 
Competences 
Having so far covered both cognitive and emotive dimensions of the concept of 
Europeanness, the final section examines attitudes of Croatian MPs towards 
further European integration. The prospects of further European integration 
(the conative dimension of Europeanness) can give us a better idea about skep-
tics and supporters of European integration, as further integration requires the 
transfer of an ever increasing number of competences to the EU level, many of 
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which have been the traditional functions of nation states. This section first 
inquires into general support for European integration and proceeds to deal 
specifically with MP’s views on allocation of competences between the EU and 
nation states, and views on empowerment of EU institutions. 
4.1  General Positions on European Integration 
The standard 11-point scale included in ENEC questionnaire8 offers a general 
overview of individual attitudes on European integration without delving deep-
er into specific components of integration. As can be seen from Figure 1, ma-
jority of interviewed MPs score above the middle of the scale, with the entire 
mean sample of 6.9. Furthermore, the values from 8 to 10 account for almost 
half of the sample (47%), which points to the overall support for European 
integration among Croatian MPs. 
Figure 1: Attitudes of Croatian MPs Towards European Integration  
 
 
Seeking any signs of ‘politicization’ of European integration, we look at the 
mainstream party positioning and cohesiveness on the issue. Table 11 shows 
that among the three mainstream parties, SDP is the most favorable about 
                                                             
8  Survey question: “Some say European unification should be strengthened. Others say it 
already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-
point-scale. On this scale, '0' means unification ‘has already gone too far’ and '10' means it 
‘should be strengthened’. What number on this scale best describes your position?”  
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strengthening the European integration (ENEC score, 7.71), and is closely 
followed by HNS (ENEC score, 7.6), its junior coalition partner, while HDZ 
lags behind the two forerunners (ENEC score, 6.94). To validate the party 
positions on European integration based on MPs responses, we supplement 
ENEC measure with the measure from the CHES dataset (Table 11, in brack-
ets). Some authors would argue that opposition parties use the issue of Europe-
an integration as yet another front on which to attack the government (Mair 
2001). However, the reserved position of HDZ towards the EU (relative to SDP 
and HNS) has meaningful roots in its ideology. It ‘owns’ the issue of Croatian 
independence, which pushes HDZ towards soft Eurosceptic position, as Euro-
pean integration implies ceding some of country’s sovereignty to supranational 
level. On the other hand, SDP and HNS applaud the EU as a community of 
liberal values and anti-nationalism. With regard to the economic dimension, as 
both HDZ and SDP occupy central position on the scale, their attitudes on 
European integration are favorable.  
Table 11: Party Position and Cohesiveness on European Integration1 – ENEC and 
CHES Data Compared2 
 Position on Euro-
pean integration Cohesion Min Max 
Number of 
MPs 
DC 5 (-) - (-) 5 5 1 
HDSSB 5.75 (4.75) 2.87 (1.17) 4 10 4 
HDZ 6.94 (6.22) 2.29 (1.56) 2 10 16 
HL 5 (5.56) 1.41 (1.75) 3 6 4 
HNS 7.6 (7) 2.37 (1.11) 3 10 10 
HSP AS 7 (3.63) - (4) 7 7 1 
HSS 5 (5) - (1.67) 5 5 1 
HSU 4.5 (-) 3.54 (-) 2 7 2 
IDS 6.5 (6.78) 2.12 (0.71) 5 8 2 
NZ 6.33 (-) 2.31 (-) 5 9 3 
ORaH 5 (6.11) - (1) 5 5 1 
SDP 7.71 (6.55) 1.71 (1.22) 5 10 24 
Total 6.93 2.18 2 10 69 
1 Survey question: “Some say European unification should be strengthened. Others say it 
already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate your views using a 10-point-
scale. On this scale, '0' means unification 'has already gone too far' and '10' means it 'should 
be strengthened'. What number on this scale best describes your position?”; CHES uses the 
same 0-10 scale, on which parties are placed by country experts (in brackets). 
2 The measure of party cohesion in ENEC is the standard deviation of party MPs' responses on 
the general European integration scale, and is not directly comparable to the measure from 
CHES, where parties are placed by experts on the 0-10 scale, where 0 stands for maximum 
cohesion (in brackets). 
 
Furthermore, as second column in Table 11 shows, SDP (1.78) appears to be 
more internally cohesive on the issue of European integration than HDZ (2.29) 
and HNS (2.36). Edwards (2009) argues convincingly that for a party to be 
internally cohesive on the issue of European integration positions on economic 
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and political integration have to overlap (either right-GAL or left-TAN). SDP’s 
internal cohesiveness is of little surprise given its right-GAL position on eco-
nomic and cultural dimensions of party competition. HDZ, on the other hand is 
split between pro-European faction (developed by former party president Ivo 
Sanader and adopted by current HDZ leader Andrej Plenkovic), which adopts 
center-right position on cultural dimension, and right wing faction (revived 
under the leadership of former party leader, Tomislav Karamarko) emphasizing 
national identity and sovereignty issues. This factionalization is reflected in 
higher levels of dissent among the party lines concerning the future of Europe-
an integration. 
Reflecting on our theoretical expectations, major Croatian parties are gener-
ally supportive of European integration. Nevertheless, the TAN position, which 
HDZ adopted under the presidency of Tomislav Karamarko, and many mem-
bers still hold, pulls HDZ towards soft Euroscepticism, producing internal party 
dissent over the issue. As we expected, our evidence supports the argument that 
party disagreement over Europe is likely rooted in the differences of party 
positions on cultural, rather than on economic dimension (Vachudova 2008), 
and is facilitated by lifting of EU conditionality.  
4.2  Attitudes on Europeanization of Specific Policy Areas 
Taking the analysis one step further, we disaggregate the support for European 
integration into specific policy areas, which should give us a more nuanced 
perspective on MPs preferences for allocation of policy competences (Hooghe 
2003, 282; Real-Dato, Göncz, and Lengyel 2012, 2012), as well as hint at the 
specific issues of disagreement between the mainstream parties. The results 
(Figure 2) are generally in line with the previous findings of elite studies, 
which apply the functionalist argument (Wessels and Kielhorn 1999). Simply 
put, the geographical scope of a problem-solving authority has to match the 
geographical scope of the problem. As can be seen in Figure 2, the highest 
preference for full Europeanization is in the fields of immigration, followed by 
financial regulation and environment policy. Fighting crime is the policy field 
with lowest preference for exclusive national competence, although full Euro-
peanization is also not much favored. 
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Figure 2: Preferences on the Level of Policy Competence 
 
 
Table 12: Preferences on the Level of Policy Competence, by Party (valid 
percentages) 
 Unemployment Immigration 
 National Mixed European National Mixed European 
HDZ 58.8 11.8 29.4 52.9 11.8 35.3 
SDP 37.5 37.5 25.9 29.2 29.2 41.6 
HNS 10 40  50 0 30 70 
 Environmental policy Crime 
 National Mixed European National Mixed European 
HDZ 52.9 11.8 35.3 17.7 47 37.3 
SDP 41.7 25 33.3 20.8 54.2     25 
HNS 10 40 50 30 30 40 
 Health care Financial regulation 
 National Mixed European National Mixed European 
HDZ 70.6 23.5 5.9 41.2 23.5 35.3 
SDP 75 25 0 29.2 37.5 33.3 
HNS 90 10        0      10    20      70 
Survey question: “How do you think it would be most appropriate to deal with each of the 
following policy areas? Do you think that [area] should be mainly dealt with at regional level, 
at national level, or at European Union level?” 
 
Eyeballing the aggregate party preferences for national and European level 
(Table 12) reveals specific reasons why HDZ is more skeptical towards Euro-
pean integration than the other two parties (Table 11). Compared to SDP, HDZ 
prefers national competence in four out of six policy areas. Still, the largest 
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differences between HDZ and SDP can be observed in the field of immigration. 
This adds further support to the hypothesis predicting that if it at all occurs, 
politicization will be more related to the cultural, rather than to the economic 
dimension of party competition. The issue of immigration is strongly related to 
the cultural dimension of party competition, which structures the Croatian 
political space. Parties that culturally position themselves on the right have 
traditionally been skeptical over granting too much authority in the immigra-
tion policy to the European Commission, since the EC bureaucrats favor more 
liberal immigration policies compared to national governments (Luedtke 2011). 
The breakdown of results regarding the preferred level of policy competence 
(Europeanization in 10 years) (Figure 3) reveals strong preference for Europe-
anization of these policy areas. Exactly 60% of Croatian MPs are strongly or 
somewhat in favor of a unified tax system in the next 10 years (column 1). 
Even stronger is the support for a common system of social security, as almost 
80% of Croatian MPs favor such a solution (column 2), although it would be 
highly consequential for domestic budget. Both findings go against the func-
tional argument of Wessels and Kielhorn (1999), distributional logic laid down 
by Hooghe (Hooghe 2003, 289-90), as well as the findings from IntUne project 
where MPs preferred tax policy in the national realm (Real-Dato, Göncz, and 
Lengyel 2012, 69). Moreover, there seems to be little disagreement on these 
preferences between the mainstream parties (Table 13). How can we account 
for this paradox? 
Figure 3: Preferences for Europeanization in the Next 10 Years 
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Table 13: Preferences for Europeanization in the Next 10 Years, by Party (valid 
percentages) 
 Tax Social security Foreign policy 
 Agree Disagree Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
HDZ 70.6 29.4 82.4 17.6 82.3 17.7 
SDP 62.5 37.5 83.3 16.7 100 0 
HNS 70 30 70 30 100 0 
       
 Help for regions Eurobonds   
 Agree Disagree Agree Disagree   
HDZ 93.8 6.2 91.7 8.3   
SDP 100 0 83.3 16.7   
HNS 100 0 88.9 11.1   
Survey question: “Thinking about the European Union over the next 10 years, can you tell me 
whether you are in favor or against the following (item).” 
1 'Strongly agree' and 'agree somewhat' merged as one category. 
2 'Strongly disagree' and ‘somewhat disagree' merged as one category. 
 
Although the crisis left Croatia grapple with high public debt, shrinkage of the 
economy, record-high unemployment and poverty, inter-party consensus on 
further Europeanization of social security is expected because of Croatia’s EU 
beneficiary status where the country would profit more from further European-
ization. In addition, the redistribution to the less well-off citizens and regions to 
be successful, a common tax system has to be in place. Along our expectations, 
there is little inter-party division along these two economic aspects of European 
integration. Therefore, against the government spending logic of Hooghe 
(2003, 289-90), we suggest that for the EU budget beneficiaries such as Croa-
tia, increasing the scope and depth of European redistributive system might 
actually be favorable and lead to inter-party consensus. 
4.3  Attitudes on the Empowerment of EU Institutions 
With MPs being ready to transfer some authority to the EU level, the question 
of capacity of these EU institutions naturally arises; are MPs ready to empower 
supranational institutions such as the European Commission and European 
Parliament? As data in Table 14 demonstrate, Croatian MPs are largely in favor 
of empowering European Parliament (82%) and European Commission (72%). 
Moreover, we find that 67% of MPs favor a state-like democracy, where Euro-
pean government would answer to the European Parliament, making support 
for supranational institutions quite considerable. However, these findings go 
against all odds, as in Croatia, the issue of sovereignty is still a touchy subject 
among both the public and the elites given Croatia’s recent independence. 
Empirically, the analysis reveals that 94% of Croatian MPs’ agree that Member 
States should remain the central actors of the EU. 
A key to the puzzle lies in the perception of MPs that Croatia is on the los-
ing side of EU intergovernmental decision-making process. First, the analysis 
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of perceptions of threats to the EU reveals that putting national interests ahead 
of European might endanger the EU (Table 10). Second, Croatian MPs are 
quite worried that Croatian interests reach EU institutions (76%), and third, 
they almost unanimously believe that some Member States have disproportion-
ate power at the EU level (96%) (Table 3). We argue that by strengthening the 
EU level institutions Croatian MPs hope to curb the power of the most influen-
tial states, and expect the EU institutions to offer a better channel for represen-
tation of Croatian interests than in the current EU institutional setup. Similarly 
to the issues of tax policy and social security, empowerment of EU institutions 
does not produce inter-party disagreement (Table 14). Therefore, the obvious 
feeling of being underrepresented in the EU decision-making process did not 
lead to rejection of the European integration, but to the cross-party agreement 
about the need for its strengthening. 
Table 14: Attitudes of MPs Towards Empowerment of European Institutions, by 
Party (valid percentages) 
 National interests European Commission European Parliament 
 Agree1 Disagree2 Agree Disagree Agree Disagree 
HDZ 100 0 87.5 12.5 82.4 17.6 
SDP 87      13 78.3 21.7 82.6 17.4 
HNS 100 0 72 28 82.6 17.4 
Total 94.2 5.8 72 28 82.6 17.4 
Survey question: “How much do you agree with the following statements? The Member States 
ought to remain the central actors of the European Union; The European Commission ought to 
become the true government of the European Union; The powers of the European parliament 
ought to be strengthened.” 
1 'Strongly agree' and 'agree somewhat' merged as one category. 
2 'Strongly disagree' and ‘somewhat disagree' merged as one category. 
5.  Conclusion  
In this article, we offer the first systematic analysis of the attitudes of Croatian 
parliamentarians about the three dimensions of Europeanness. Moreover, we 
seek evidence of inter-party differences (‘constraining dissensus’) across the 
three largest parliamentary parties in 2011-2015 legislature; governing SDP, its 
junior coalition partner HNS and oppositional HDZ. After an overwhelming 
consensus among Croatian party elites prior to EU membership in 2013, we are 
interested in whether consensus persists once accession-related constraints are 
lifted.  
Building on the studies that note party differences surface once EU member-
ship is acquired, especially among conservative parties (Vachudova 2008), we 
suggest rational calculations and beneficiary member mindset among Croatian 
MPs suppress the divergence of attitudes on European integration among the 
main Croatian political parties. This is why only soft Euroscepticism in cultural 
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and value dimensions of Europeanness is expected among right oriented HDZ. 
Our data are part of ENEC (2014) project that we complement with CHES data 
while discussing general attitudes on European integration. Data analysis rest 
on 70 interviews with Croatian MPs in the second half of 2014, which created a 
unique opportunity for us to interview the same set of MPs who voted in favor 
of Croatia’s entry in 2012.  
We find that Croatian MPs are overall largely positive about various aspects 
of Europeanness one year into its short EU membership. They are satisfied 
with EU benefits, favor further European integration and policy Europeaniza-
tion and largely identify as European elite. They also report solid degree of 
trust into EU institutions as well as praise their institutional management dur-
ing Eurozone crisis. Soft Euroscepticism is voiced by both political camps only 
regarding poor representation of Croatian interests at the EU level. However, 
we did uncover some divergence in positions on European integration, and EU 
in particular, between the three Croatian political parties in our analysis. As 
expected, these inter-party differences are most visible in value and cultural 
issues, where MPs from HDZ are slightly more Eurosceptic than their counter-
parts from SDP and HNS. As our data demonstrate, MPs from HDZ are less 
attached to the EU, less satisfied with EU benefits, more mistrustful of EU 
institutions, more concerned with unequal interest representation, more con-
cerned about ‘others’ as threats to the EU, and less in favor of further European 
integration compared to MPs from left wing SDP and HNS. With regards to 
further European integration HDZ is less internally cohesive than are the other 
two parties, which reveals some party factionalization within HDZ, one empha-
sizing pro-EU and the other emphasizing nationalist discourse.  
Finally, we find evidence that beneficiary status of Croatia suppresses any 
stronger anti -EU sentiments. This is very clearly demonstrated by our data on 
further policy Europeanization; even in areas that are traditionally saved for 
national domain (e.g. tax and social security), and on extension of the powers 
of the Parliament and the Commission. As EU budget receiver, Croatian MPs 
hope for EU redistributive capacities and protection of Croatia’s interests that 
would result from further Europeanization. Nevertheless, negative feedback 
about Europeanness by right wing MPs can be understood as only soft Euro-
scepticism, because MPs from all parties are still generally positive about al-
most all aspects of Europeanness. In addition, we also warn against over-
interpretation of the results, because in many dimensions, we cannot fully 
establish whether inter-party differences are a result of some predictable pattern 
or are simple government-opposition dynamic. This is something we hope to 
determine by further research.  
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